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COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

LAWS AS TACTICS
DEAN SPADE*
It seems to me that the real political task in a
society such as ours is to criticize the workings
of institutions that appear to be both neutral
and independent, to criticize and attack them
in such a manner that political violence that
has always exercised itself through them will
be unmasked so that one can fight against
them. If we want right away to define the
profile and the formula of our future
society without criticizing all the forms of
political power that are exerted in our society,
there is a risk that they reconstitute
themselves ....

-Michel

Foucault'

This symposium invites us to consider the impact of Judith
Butler's work on legal scholarship in the area of gender and
sexuality. I am interested in reflecting particularly on trans
politics and law for two reasons. First, because Butler's work
has had such a significant impact on the emergence of the
current iteration of trans politics of the 1990s and 2000s.
Second, because I believe there is a great deal more that Butler's
work can offer to significant questions facing trans resistance
formations as the field of trans legal rights advocacy
institutionalizes and as trans legal scholarship engages and
responds to that institutionalization. In particular, I am interested
in how Butler's work has provided analytical models for
considering the role that norms and normalization play in both
* Dean Spade is an assistant professor at Seattle University School of
Law. He is indebted to Craig Willse and Jane Anderson for their feedback on
early drafts of this work.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE CHOMSKY-FOUCAULT
NOAM CHOMSKY
DEBATE: ON HUMAN NATURE 41 (New Press 2006) (1974).
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disciplinary and biopolitical modes of governance relating to
gender. This analysis is essential to understanding the limitations
of certain legal rights frameworks for addressing harms created
by racialized and gendered systems of meaning and control.
Broadly speaking, I want to think about how the work of
both Butler and Foucault directs legal scholars and activists to
reject a limited framework of fighting for our rights under the
law. Instead, we are invited to consider how we come to
understand ourselves as subjects of various legal regimes, how
certain things come to be governed, how certain disciplinary and
regulatory knowledges and practices congeal into institutional
forms, 2 how the nation state formation is co-constituted with
regularized categories of identity, what relations produce and
reproduce racialized-gendered subjections, and how resistances
can be conceived from within power relations that are never
transparent or centralized. For trans politics and law scholarship,
these inquiries constitute a necessary critical engagement with
legal reform projects that are in conversation with Critical Race
Theory, women of color feminism, queer of color critique,
critical disability studies and other critical analytical
methodologies that are providing key tools to the development
of critical trans inquiry and practice.
This Article will look at how trans scholarship and activism
have taken up disciplinary critiques of gender, often influenced
by Butler, and suggest that further development of critical trans
perspectives focused on sites of regularization is needed, for
which Butler's work on governmentality can be useful. To start,
I describe some of the key concepts from Butler's work that
have been taken up in trans politics and briefly review the
distinctions Foucault offers between sovereignty, discipline and
biopolitics. I then examine some of the ways that trans politics
has critiqued disciplinary norms, looking at resistance to the
medicalization of trans identity and the response to anti-trans
feminism. Next, I look at areas where the operation of
racialized-gendered normalization at the population level are
2 MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERMENTALITY 18

(1999) ("On the one hand, we

govem others and ourselves according to what we take to be true about who we
are, what aspects of our existence should be worked upon, how, with what means
and to what ends ....
On the other hand, the ways in which we govern and
conduct ourselves give rise to different ways of producing truth.").
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being examined and might be further troubled by trans scholars
and activists. Here I look at critiques of identity surveillance
practices that use gender as a category of identity verification
and critiques of certain trans law reform projects. Using Butler's
work, I raise questions about the role of law reform in resistance
to various sites of gender regularization and suggest areas of
further inquiry that might be taken up by scholars and activists
engaging a critical trans politics rooted in a skepticism about law
reform projects.
Enough cannot be said about the influence of Butler's
work, especially Gender Trouble, on the development of
contemporary trans politics. Butler's articulation of gender as
"the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts
within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to3
produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being
has broadly and deeply impacted the most central conversations
about what a politics of trans resistance is resisting and what
claims it might make. Butler argues that, "the body is not a mute
facticity."'4 Gender has no truth but rather is a matrix of norms
and repeated practices. "[l]f the inner truth of gender is a
fabrication and if a true gender is a fantasy instituted and
inscribed on the surface of bodies, then it seems that genders can
be neither true nor false, but are only produced as the truth'5
effects of a discourse of primary and stable identity.
"Femininity is thus not the product of a choice, but the forcible
citation of a norm, one whose complex historicity is
indissociable from relations of discipline, regulation,
punishment." 6 Butler shows that gender is not a natural fact but
instead a set of congealed, repeated practices that produce a field
,of regulation in which all people are compelled to perform

3

JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 33 (1990)

[hereinafter GENDER

TROUBLE].
4

Id. at 129.

5 Id. at 136.
6 JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 232 (1993) [hereinafter BODIES
THAT MATTER].
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gender. Doing so is a matter of survival. 7 Given this
understanding of gender, she suggests a framework for building
an analysis of gender that is, in my view, essential to theorizing
feminist and trans resistance:
A political genealogy of gender ontologies, if
it is successful, will deconstruct the
substantive appearance of gender into its
constitutive acts and locate and account for
those acts within the compulsory frames set by
the various forces that police the social
appearance of gender. 8
Understanding gender as an effect of discourse rather than a
cause and calling for an examination of disciplinary and
regulatory sites of the production of gender initiates a strategic
approach to resistance that departs from the production of
certain truth claims that underlie liberal equality and equal
opportunity arguments that are typically centered by legal
reform projects. 9 Butler helps us to think through law and
subjection from an understanding of power as productive rather
than repressive, arguing that:
[S]ubject positions are always assumed in
response to the reprimand of the law; acts of
disobedience must always take place within
the law using the terms that constitute us;
subjects are always implicated in the relations
of power but since they are also enabled by
them they are not merely subordinated to the
law. . . . [I]t would be no more right to claim
JUDITH BUTLER,

PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER 20 (1997)

[hereinafter

PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER] ("Where social categories guarantee a recognizable
and enduring social cxistence, the embrace of such categories, even as they
work in the service of subjection, is often preferred to no social existence at
all.").
8 GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 33.
9
Chela Sandoval's work describing five forms of oppositional
consciousness engaged by social movements in the United States in the late 20th
century is a useful tool for examining the limitations of what she calls the "equal
rights" form. CHELA SANDOVAL, METHODOLOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 56 (2000).
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that the term 'construction' belongs at the
grammatical site of [the] subject, for
construction is neither a subject nor its act, but
a process of reiteration by which both
.subjects' and 'acts' come to appear at all.

There is no power that acts, but only a
reiterated acting that is power in its persistence
and instability. 10
Butler's analysis of gender and her theory of performativity in
particular provide an understanding of gender as a norm that
operates in both the disciplinary and biopolitical modes that are
essential terrain for law scholars and activists considering trans
subjection and resistance.'' Foucault describes disciplinary and
biopolitical modes of power as distinct from sovereignty,
providing a framework that, as I argue elsewhere, is particularly
useful for examining the limitations of the understandings of
power that underlie legal reform projects based in the antidiscrimination principle. 12 Foucault describes sovereignty as
power rooted in the "right to kill" (wielded against individual
heretics or other disobedient people) or in "subtraction"-the
power to take away. This subtractive power is wielded by the
sovereign with the aim of obedience to the law and the
maintenance of sovereign power itself. 13 Discipline, on the other
hand, establishes norms of good behavior and ideas about proper
and improper categories of subjects. Foucault famously traces
the invention of certain categories of sexual subjects, including

10BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 6,

at 122-3.

11 See PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER, supra note 8, at 13 (1997). ("Power not

only acts on a subject but, in a transitive sense, enacts the subject into being.").
12 DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL

TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 2011; Dean Spade, Lecture at Barnard
Center for Research on Women: Trans Politics on a Neoliberal Landscape (Feb.
9, 2009) (on file with author); Dean Spade, Thomas Lecture at Yale Law School:
Beyond Recognition (Jan. 2, 2010), availableat http://ylsqtss.law.yale.edu:8080/
qtmedia/lectures I 0/YLSThomasSpadeO2O8 10_s.mov.
13 Michel Foucault, Governmentality, 95 in FOCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY:

WITH TWO LECTURES BY AND AN INTERVIEW WITH

MICHEL FOUCAULT (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991)
[hereinafter Governmentality].
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the homosexual, the reproductive couple and the masturbating
child, to argue that relations of power produced these identities
through an explosion of discourse about sexuality in the
Victorian period. 14 Disciplinary practices congeal in certain
institutional locations such as the school, the factory and the
clinic, where proper behavior is codified at the level of detail,
and subjects are formed to police ourselves and each other
according to these norms. Unlike discipline and sovereignty,
biopolitics is concerned with population rather than individuals.
Whereas sovereignty is defined by the right of the sovereign to
kill, biopolitics is concerned with the distribution of life chances
and the imperative to make live, to cultivate the life of the
population. 15 Biopolitics develops as population grows and
governments become concerned with birth and death rates,
public health initiatives and the management of risks inherent in
the population. From a law perspective, the rise of (often
administrative) population-level interventions that we can
understand as serving a care-taking function signals this mode of
power. Immigration enforcement, social welfare programs, or
multi-dimensional campaigns like "Welfare Reform," the "War
on Drugs" or the "War on Terror" that mobilize a range of legal
and administrative technologies (e.g. education policy, criminal
punishment systems, methods of recordkeeping, family law
doctrines, public housing regulations, surveillance technologies)
are all examples of population-level interventions. These
population-level interventions are mobilized in the name of
promoting the life of the national population against perceived
threats and drains and operate through sorting and producing
regularities rather than individual targeting. This regulatory
mode of power is not concerned with obedience to law and the
maintenance of sovereign power, but rather has multiple and

14 MICHEL FOUCAULT,

I HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans.,

1990) (1977).
IS MICHEL FOUCAULT, "SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED": LECTURES AT THE

COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1975-1976 241 (David Macey trans., 2003) [hereinafter
"SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED"].

HeinOnline -- 21 Colum. J. Gender & L. 45 2011-2012

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

diffuse aims, with each area being governed having a set of ends
seen as convenient or desirable to those things.16
Foucault suggests that biopolitics and discipline have the
norm in common:
In more general terms, we can say that there is
one element that will circulate between the
disciplinary and the regulatory, which will also
be applied to the body and population alike,
which will make it possible to control both the
disciplinary order of the body and the aleatory
events that occur in the biopolitical
multiplicity. The element that circulates
between the two is the norm. The norm is
something that can be applied both to a body
one wishes to discipline and a population one
wishes to regularize. 17
Norms of behavior that operate at the individual level and that
are incorporated by subjects into their self-understanding are
essential to discipline. Biopolitics mobilizes norms at the
population level through sorting technologies that produce
structured security and insecurity for various populations in the
distribution of life chances.
Foucault's description of biopolitics as a form of power
concerned with cultivating life, "making live," raises the
question of how genocide, massacre and other killing can occur
in the context of this life-giving biopolitical power. Foucault
identifies "state racism" to answer this question. He explains that
this population-focused power concerned with promoting life
always includes the identification of threats and drains to the
16See Governmentality, supra note 13, at 95 ("Government is defined as a

right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common
good ... but to an end which is 'convenient' for each of thc things that arc to be
governed. This implies a plurality of specific aims: for instance, government will
have to ensure that the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the
people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the population is
enabled to multiply, etc. There is a whole series of specific finalities, then, which
become the objective of government as such.").
17 "SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED," supra note 15, at 253.
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population, and that the destruction or killing of these threats in
order to preserve and promote the life of the population is
always present in biopolitics. Importantly, Foucault explains that
killing:
[Does] not mean simply murder as such, but
also every form of indirect murder: the fact of
exposing someone to death, increasing the risk
of death for some people, or quite simply,
political death, expulsion, rejection, and so
on.

18

Thus, the function of biopolitical power is not the "right to kill"
as in sovereignty, but the power to "make live and let die."' 9
Butler's theorization of gender, especially her description
of the operation of disciplinary gender norms, has significantly
influenced key debates in trans activism, law reform and legal
scholarship. I believe that Butler's work has further
contributions to make to emerging conversations in trans law
and politics that are examining biopolitical operations of gender
as a regulatory technology in the context of neoliberalism. In
this Article I want to look at a few of the debates in trans law
and activism where Butler's theorization of gender has enabled
important analysis and raise some areas where further
engagement with Butler's work might be beneficial.

t.

Gender Norms and Disciplinary Critiques

Butler's theorization of gender has been taken up in the
critique of the medical model of transsexuality, an important
topic in trans politics and law in recent decades. Butler's
assertion that sex "imposes an artificial unity on an otherwise
discontinuous set of attributes" ' 20 and articulation of gender as a
coagulation of repetitive acts appearing as a natural fact provides
a pathway for critiquing how the production of transsexuality in
medicine is category-stabilizing for sex and gender. Scholars and
11Id. at 256.
19Id. at 241.
20 GENDER TROUBLE,

supra note 3, at 114.
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activists have taken up these tools to make several important
critiques of the medicalization of trans identity. We have
critiqued how the diagnostic criteria of Gender Identity Disorder

produces a fiction of a naturalized, untroubled binary gender
identity for non-trans people, including a gender-appropriate

childhood filled with gender-appropriate toys, role plays and
friends. 2' The existence of the criteria, we have also asserted,
establishes a mechanism of surveillance by creating a category
of deviance that gender non-normative behavior can trigger,
which has often particularly led to involuntary psychiatric
treatment in young people. 22 We have also taken issue with the
gatekeeping role that medical providers occupy in the lives of
trans people on several fronts. The authorization of doctors to

provide or deny a GID diagnosis and to determine eligibility for
gender confirming medical treatment is reflected in the DSM,
the various standards of care, and in jurisprudence and
administrative policies where medical evidence is required for
various forms of recognition of a trans person's gender identity
or eligibility for treatment. 23 Trans people have contested the
expert knowledges that have been developed to supposedly
guide medical practitioners in determining which of us are
"true" as well as the mechanisms that codify our dependence on

21 See, e.g., Franklin Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a
New Conception of Gender Identity in the law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
713, 725; Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine/Remodeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 15 (2003). Interestingly, some of the critiques of tile diagnostic
criteria have made an impact on the new draft criteria for the DSM-5. See,
DSM-5 Development: Sexual and Gender Identity Disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC
Assoc., http://www.dsm5.org/Proposed Revisions/Pages/
SexualandGenderldentityDisorders.aspx (last visited June 22, 2011).
22 Spade, supra note 21; Kelly Winters, Issues of Psychiatric Diagnosis
jfr Gender Nonconforming Youth, GID Reform Advocates, http://
www.gidrefonn.org/gid3026.html (last visited June 22, 2011); Beth E. Molnar,
Juveniles and Psychiatric Institutionalization. Toward Better Due Process and
Treatment Review in the United States, 2 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. (1997), DYLAN
SCHOLINSKI, THE LAST TIME I WORE A DRESS (1997).

23 Spade, supra note 21; Pooja S. Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, Unraveling
hijustice: Race and Class Impact of Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-Related
Health Care, 4 SEXUALITY RES. SOC. POL'Y 7, 11 (2007); Paisley Currah and
Lisa Jean Moore, "We Won t Know Who You Are": Contesting Sex Designations
on New York City Birth Certificates, 24 HYPATIA 3 (2009).
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their performance of this work. 24 These arrangements result in
the enforcement of rigid gender norms on trans bodies with
doctors often requiring performances of hyper masculinity and
femininity read through straight, white, upper class nons.
Those who fail to meet the arbitrary, subjective criteria of their
medical providers are frequently denied access to care. 25 Critical
trans studies scholars and activists have identified these criteria
and relationships of authority as technologies of the production
of gender normativity in which trans
bodies experience
26
intensified surveillance and correction.
In law these discussions have been reflected in debates
about the use of medical standards and norms in various rights
and recognition claims by trans people. Medical evidence is
typically used to prove the realness of trans people's gender in
cases that hinge on marriage recognition. 27 Genital surgery
requirements are a common feature in policies governing change
of sex designation on ID. 28 Medical evidence is frequently used
to determine sex for purposes of accessing sex-segregated
facilities. 29 These are examples of areas where the intertwining
of legal and medical authority in trans people's lives has been
subject to a critique of naturalized gender categories and the
disciplinary norms that compel their perpetual performance. The
debate over whether trans people should pursue disability
discrimination claims, which generally hinge upon providing a
medical framing of trans identity, also reflects these critical
24

ld.

25 Id.
26

Id.; see also SANDY STONE, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: A

POSTTRANSSEXUAL

MANIFESTO

(1987),

available

at

http://

www.actlab.utexas.edu/-sandy/empire-strikes-back; Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes
Don't Make the Man (or WomaO, but Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER L. 90, 90-91 (2006); Alvin Lee, Trans Models in Prison: The
Medicalization of Gender Identity and the Eighth Amendment Right to Sex
Reassignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J. L. GENDER 447 (2008).
27

See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976);

Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155, (Fla. St. Ct. App. 2004).
28 Dean

Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2008).
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discussions. Many advocates on both sides of the debate engage
both a critical disability studies framework, understanding
disability as constructed by societal barriers to participation
rather than stemming naturally from impairment, and also
generally engage a feminist theorization of trans identity that
problematizes individualizing the "disorder" to trans people
rather than troubling the systems of gender assignment and
enforced performance. 30 They part ways in some instances on
questions of whether using disability discrimination claims
eclipses opportunities to have courts decide trans cases on sex
discrimination claims that might also be used and do not require
medical evidence but instead focus on the discriminator's
inappropriate use of gender criteria. Sometimes the conflict
emerges in an analysis of how establishing any medical
evidentiary requirements disproportionately impacts those
populations with the least access to medical care and transspecific medical care in particular, especially people of color,
youth, people with disabilities, immigrants, and poor people. 3'
As activists and scholars have examined, debated and
navigated the centrality of medical authority in trans lives that
stems from the medical production of the category of
transsexuality and its circulation, the double bind of desiring
access to care, which generally requires the existence of a
diagnosable condition, while wanting to demedicalize trans
identity because of the consequences of the requirements of

30 See NICK GORTON, MAKEZINE, TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF GID, THE
MODEL OF DISEASE,

AND THE TRANSGENDER

COMMUNITY,

http://

makezinc.enoughcnough.org/giddisease.htm (last visited June 26, 2011); Spade
supra note 21, at 24-35; Levi, supra note 26; Lee, supra note 26.
31 For a discussion of how various medical evidentiary requirements

combined with transphobic Medicaid policies impact low income trans people
and trans people of color, see Gehi Arkles, supra note 23; See Dean Spade,
Medicaid Policy Gender-ConfirmingHealthcareJbrTrans People. An Interview
with Advocates, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 497 (2010) [hereinafter Spade,
Medicaid Policy].
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32
medical approval in so many realms has remained vexing.
Scholars and activists whose work focuses on trans people of
color and trans poor people have frequently reframed this debate
by pointing out that the most vulnerable trans people already
lose out in both frameworks because of the overwhelming trend
of denying trans health care in Medicaid programs, while at the
same time requiring proof of having undergone such care in the
administrative policies of the most dangerous systems and
institutions. 33 This argument suggests that the binds of
medicalization, while including inconsistent disciplinary and
regulatory norms regarding trans identity and access to medical
technology, have little to offer those facing the worst
manifestations of compounding vectors of racialized-gendered
medical neglect and surveillance. This debate, as well as the
broader set of discussions about the medicalization of trans
identity, benefit from the tools Butler provides to critique the
naturalization of sex and gender and examine the locations and
conditions of its continued reproduction. Trans people facing the
requirements of performance for a medical gaze and the legal
consequences of success or failure at being authorized as "real"
have questioned how the production of the category of
transsexuality creates a fiction of non-trans gender binarism and
what it might mean to strategize against specific sites where
medical criteria or authorities operate as gate keepers for various
survival needs of trans people.

32 One framework for reconceptualizing this bind is to imagine.gender
confirming health care for trans people being treated more like other health care
that has traditionally been stigmatized because of patriarchal frameworks about
gender. Trans people's needs for gender confirming health care might be treated
more like pregnancy-something that happens to some bodies and requires care
but is not an illness or pathology. Of course, pregnancy is often pathologized and
over-mcdicalized, so the concerns remain, but in general the idea of placing trans
health needs in the same framework as pregnancy-related care, abortion, birth
control, and other care that has been politicized by feminists and exposed as a
site of regulation of gender, race and ability offers a vantage point for
understanding that trans identity need not be considered "disordered" in order for
health services to be considered necessary. Another framework for addressing
this bind is observing that gender confirming health care is already regularly
provided to non-trans people and covered by both public and private insurance
programs. See Spade, MedicaidPolicy, supra note 3 1.
33Gehi & Arkles, supra note 23.
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These critical engagements have also produced responses
to the demonization of trans people by certain feminists. Antitrans feminists have charged that trans people are gender
defenders who seek to reify traditional patriarchal gender roles
by mimicking them, that we are imposters (transwomen) and
defectors (transmen), and that we participate in the
commodification of gender and the increasing expansion of
capitalist medical authority. 34 Responses to these arguments
have often centered on the kind of analysis Butler invites,
questioning the marking of trans bodies as the only bodies that
mimic gender norms, that (mis)understand ourselves through
traditional patriarchal gender roles, and that are produced as
gendered beings through political and economic conditions.
These responses to anti-trans feminism have often called on antitrans feminists to apply the same rigor with which they critique
trans performances of gender to their own performances of
gender and to question the existence of such a thing as the
"natural" or unmodified gendered body. Transfeminism has
become a topic in academia as well as material for interactive
activist workshops, zines, and propaganda. This (re)claiming of
feminism operates from an analysis of gender as a disciplinary
technology that mobilizes ideas of nature and realness to
establish norms of proper gendered embodiment and behavior,
recognizing that feminists as much as anyone else can and do
establish and police those boundaries. 35 Scholars and activists
continue to respond to the ways that organizing under the sign of
"trans politics" produces norns of proper trans identity at
various sites, refuting the notion that particular embodiments,
performances or articulations of gender are more or less
liberatory while still seeking out resistance to disciplinary
regimes based in an understanding that all people exceed and fail

14 JANICE RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE

SHE-MALE (1977); Dwight Billings
Thomas Urban, The Socio-Medical
Construction of Transsexualism: An Interpretation and Critique, 29 SOC. PROBS.
3 (1982).
35 Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in THE LESBIAN
AND GAY STUDIES READER 308 (Henry Abelove et al. cds., 1993) ("[I]dentity
categories tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes, whether as the
normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the rallying points for
liberatory contestation of that very oppression.").
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at gender norms.3 6 Butler argues that gender is an effect of
discourse, a "corporeal style," a sequence of acts, a strategy that
has survival as its end because deviations are routinely, though
inconsistently and unevenly, punished. 37 This analysis
continually comes to the fore when battles rage between various
iterations of trans politics that valorize either more traditional
"true transsexual" identities or genderqueer and binary-resisting
identities.Such an analysis invites a more complex
understanding of identity, institutionalization, and conditions of
subjection and resistance that allow us to avoid simplistic claims
that certain gender identities are more liberatory than others.
II. Gender Norms and the Production of Regularities
The analytical tools developed by Butler's theorization of
gender have primarily been used in trans scholarship and
activism to examine disciplinary gender norms. Butler's
engagement with Foucault's discussion of governmentality,
however, and her various inquiries about "grievable life,"
persons "deemed dangerous," and the co-constitutive
relationship between identity categories and the nation also offer
rich terrain for scholars and activists interested in trans politics,
law and resistance in the context of neoliberalism. 38 These
conversations are emerging in trans scholarship and activism,
and in this section Ihope to trace a few sites of that analysis and
suggest how some of the moves Butler makes in these strains of
her work might be particularly useful.
Foucault explains that unlike sovereignty, which regards
obedience to the law as its primary aim, governmentality is
concerned with "the right manner of disposing things so as to

36 "The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics;
rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is
articulated." GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 148. See also Butler, supra note

35.
37 GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 139-40; see SARA SALIH, JUDITH
BUTLER 66 (2002).
38 See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE (2004) [hereinafter
PRECARIOUS LIFE].
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lead to ...an end which is 'convenient' to each of the things that
are to be governed. '39 He writes:
[W]ith government it is a question not of
imposing law on men, but of disposing things:
that is to say, of employing tactics rather than
laws, and even of using laws themselves as
tactics-to arrange things in such a way that,
through a certain number of means, such and
such ends may be achieved.40
This understanding of laws as tactics that are part of a
decentralized context in which multiple and competing goals coexist is exceptionally useful for conceptualizing the limitations
of legal equality and inclusion claims and for accounting for the
distributions that occur through certain vectors of population or
identity. I take Foucault's formulation to include a caution
against taking what the law says about itself at face value and an
invitation to instead interrogate what arrangement of things a
given line of jurisprudence or matrix of rules might be a part of
producing. Such a view allows us to suspend expectations of a
certain kind of rationality or consistency and suspend a belief
that irrationality or incoherence are terribly helpful charges to
make in opposition to various legal regimes, which are of course
decentralized and full of contradiction. Instead, we might look
for the broader patterns, beyond what law says it is doing, to see
how it contributes to certain arrangements that concern us.

39Governmentality, supra note 13, at 95.
40

Id. Butler discusses how "govcmmentality exposes law as a setof

tactics. . their operation is 'justified' by their aim, but not through recourse to
any set of prior principles or legitimating functions" in her exploration of the
Guantanamo Bay prisoners. PRECARIOUS LIFE, supra note 38, at 94.
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For example, as immigration detention has rapidly
increased in the United States, 4 1 activists including lawyers and
law students have sought to document and expose the abuses
faced by detainees, often demanding the creation of procedures
that would hopefully reduce long stays in detention and their
attendant harms. The talking points of these advocates often
include the assertion that these detainees are not criminals, that
they are in a civil detention system, yet they are deprived of
even the basic rights afforded to people in criminal detention in
the United States. 42 The implication is that, being non-criminals,
immigration detainees deserve at least as much if not more
protection and process than people in the criminal system. This
analogy is troubling for at least three reasons: (1) it suggests a
deserving/undeserving framework that reifies demonization of

41 INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, VOICES
FROM DETENTION: A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AT THE
NORTHWEST DETENTION CENTER IN TACOMA, WASHINGTON, 3 (2008)

[hereinafter VOICES FROM DETENTION], available at http://www.law.seattleu.cdu/
documcnts/news/archivc/2008/DRFinal.pdf ("Detention is a very rapidly
growing form of incarceration. The numbers are escalating. In 2001, the U.S.
detained approximately 95,000 people. By 2007, that number tripled to over
300,000. The average daily population of detained immigrants increased six-fold
from 5,000 in 1994 to nearly 30,000 in 2007. In 2004, Congress authorized
40,000 new detention beds by 2010, bringing up capacity to approximately
80,000. Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) reported the average stay
was 64 days in 2003, with 32% detained for 90 days or longer. Those seeking
refugee status were in detention for an average of ten months, with the longest
period being 3.5 years. Nearly 30,000 immigrants are detained daily across the
nation.").
42 Immigrants and Crime: Setting the Record Straight, IMMIGRATION
POL'Y CTR., http://immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/immigrants-and-crimesetting-record-straight (last visited June 26, 2011); New FBI Data Confirms
Falling Crime Rates in AZ, IMMIGRATION POL'Y CTR., http://
immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/new-fbi-data-confirms-falling-crime-ratcsarizona (last visited June 26 2011); Arizona s Punishment Doesn't Fit the Crime,
IMMIGRATION POL'Y CTR., http://immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/new-fbi-dataconfirms-falling-crime-rates-arizona (last visited June 26, 2011); New Data of
Federal Court Prosecutions Reveal Non-Violent Immigration Prosecutions Up,
IMMIGRATION POL'Y CTR., http://immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/new-tbi-dataconfirms-falling-crime-rates-arizona (last visited June 26, 2011) ("[Tlhe federal
government's shift in resources has meant spending billions of dollars
prosecuting non-violent immigration violators while more serious criminals
involved in drugs, weapons, and organized crime face a lower probability of
prosecution."); About Detention, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://
www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/aboutdctention (last visited June 26, 2011).

HeinOnline -- 21 Colum. J. Gender & L. 55 2011-2012

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

people targeted by criminal punishment systems, (2) it may
intensify divisions within constituencies targeted by both
immigration and criminal detention systems, and (3) it
participates in a fiction that criminal systems are fair and that
criminal defendants have enforceable rights, which justifies the
existence and continued expansion of criminalization and
imprisonment. These problems result, at least in part, from
taking the law at face value, believing what it says about itselfthat criminal and immigration detention systems are two
different things, that two different kinds of people are captured
by them, that certain rights are guaranteed as written in each
process. The result is a weak demand: That people imprisoned
by immigration enforcement be given the kinds of process that
people imprisoned by the criminal punishment system are
43
given.

Viewed through an understanding of law as a tactic of
governance in which we are invited to survey a broader field of
conditions, we might see the sharp rise of both immigration and
criminal imprisonment as a feature of neoliberalism targeting
racialized communities and recognize that the deployment of
racialized imprisonment in the name of law enforcement always
operates to mine and control certain populations marked as
drains or threats at the population level regardless of a window
dressing articulated through individual culpability and individual
rights. This analysis might be important to conceiving resistance
practices for at least two reasons. First, it might help avoid
producing a demand that merely tinkers with the legal processes
attendant to expanding imprisonment such that it gives that
expansion further legitimacy but provides no redress for the
populations continually coerced through economic and political
violence to migrate to the United States and made increasingly
vulnerable as immigration enforcement ramps up. Second, it
43 The limitations of the demand for due process are visible in the
recommendations of the VOICES FROM DETENTION, supra note 41. Like most
legal-rights focused analyses, it makes recommendations that fundamentally
retain the system of racialized immigration enforcement, making changes that
arc no doubt important but also fail to get at the root causes of displacement,
migration, exploitation and criminalization. Within the framework of legal rights,
even the most vigorous advocates doing the most front-line work for people
bearing the violence of legal systems are often left with demand options limited
to adjusting small features of that violence while the broader arrangements stay
in tact.
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might invite a strategy for resisting imprisonment that brings
people vulnerable to criminal detention and people vulnerable to
immigration detention into a shared struggle rather than putting
them at odds with each other and placing those individuals and
populations targeted by both outside of the frame of
intelligibility.
Critical race theorists and other legal scholars have named
these limitations by discussing the limits of "formal legal
equality" demands and identifying how law reform demands
often operate to transform systems facing resistance just enough
to stabilize things and preserve the status quo. 4 4 The danger of
merely tinkering with the legal window dressing and actually
stabilizing relations of disparity attends the fiction that if we
change what the law says about a vulnerable population, we will
necessarily change the key conditions of vulnerability. Taking up
Foucault's formulation of govemmentality and understanding its
differences from sovereignty helps to reveal how the assumption
that "changing what the law says about us will change our lives"
inherent in so many legal reform projects operating under the
"equality" banner not only relies on an overly centralized model
of power but also misses how law is often one tactic that
rearranges just enough to maintain the current arrangements.
Critiques of neoliberalism have often conceptualized one of its
hallmarks to be a turn toward legal equality and universal rights
that thinly masks and supports increasing racialized-gendered
disparities in wealth and life chances. 45 Understanding law as a

44 Angela Harris uses Rcva Siegel's formulation, %bpreservation through
transformation," to describe this phenomenon. "Law by its nature is
conservative, and when calls for change that threaten to destabilize existing
distributions of material and symbolic power are made, change through law will
occur in ways that preserve existing distributions to the greatest extent possible."
Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of Sexualit, 14 WM.
MARY BILL RTs. J. 1539, 1540-42, (2006) (citing Reva Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Form of Status-Enforcing State
Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997)).
45 LISA DUGGAN, TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL
POLITICS, AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY xii (2004) (describing neoliberal

hegemony as including "neoliberal 'equality' politics-a stripped down,
nonredistributive form of 'equality' designed for global consumption during the
21st century, and compatible with continued upward distribution of resources").
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tactic cautions us away from centering law reform goals in
resistance struggles.
Instead of believing what the law says about itself and
allowing that to guide resistance strategies focused on changing
what the law says about a given identity, we might look at how
the nation is produced through the production of identities that
constitute various populations as needing protection and
cultivation (to be made to live) or as dangerous threats and
drains (to be killed or abandoned). Butler asks:
How is race lived in the modality of sexuality?
How is gender lived in the modality of race?
How do colonial and neo-colonial nation states
rehearse gender relations in the consolidation
of state power? . . . To ask such questions is
still to continue to pose the question of
'identity,' but no longer as a pre-established
position or a uniform entity; rather, as part of a
dynamic map of power in which identities are
constituted and/or erased, deployed and/or
paralyzed.46
In my own work, I have examined the matrix of conflicting
administrative policies that govern when trans people can
change sex designation on different kinds of records that use sex
classification and in various systems that segregate people on
based on sex designation. 47 An obvious response to the mess of
rules is the charge that it is incoherent and inconsistent, that it
produces unfair results (similarly situated people not treated the
same), and that these rules should be standardized under one
central policy that recognizes trans people's lived identity which
will result in greater accuracy in recordkeeping as well as
reducing violence and barriers to employment, social services,
education, health care, and other essentials. I have attempted to
use an analytics of government that refuses to engage the
fantasies of accuracy and fairness that underlie identity
surveillance. Instead I have examined how the advent of certain

46 BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 6, at II 7.
41 Spade, supra note 28.
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kinds of recordkeeping is a feature of state-building projects that
produce population-level caretaking programs that always entail
identity surveillance. 48 This surveillance produces a regularized
population through the use of classification systems that collect
standardized data, and the terms of classification used tend to be
presumed neutral. 49 These classification terms, however, are
always highly contested by those who are difficult to classify or
who are unclassifiable or who contest their classification. The
cost of illegibility in these systems, of course, is any number of
conditions that generally produce a shortened lifespan.
This analysis invites us to understand trans people's
difficulties with gender classification in systems that rely on it in
the broader context of identity surveillance and gendered
detention, in particular the increase in identity surveillance and
gendered detention that have attended the "War on Terror" and
rapid growth of criminal punishment systems. 50 It suggests that a
trans politics of surveillance might do more than request that we
be counted and tracked in some way that we regard as more
accurate to our self-identifications, but instead that we engage a
broader resistance with all populations facing specific
vulnerability to increased identity surveillance, meanwhile
forming an analysis of the relationship between population-level
caretaking programs and surveillance that might inform our
48 Id. at 109-19; James C. Scott ct al., Governnent Surnames and Legal
Identities, in NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS: ESSAYS IN OPPOSITION 28-32
(Carl Watncr & Wendy McElroy eds., 2004); JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A
STATE 29-33, 72-73 (1998). See also Currah Moore, supra note 23.

Currah and Moore examine some of these same themes of stateness and
identity surveillance, taking trans people's requests for sex designation change
on birth certificates as their object of study. They ask, "[i]f the state is produced
through attempting to 'render things
immobile', how is a mutating transsexed body to be fixed, kept in place, and securely moored to the document that
purports to describe its subject?" Id. at 113.
49 GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT:
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 64-71, 195-225 (1999).

50 Puar usefully takes up the broader question of sexual and gender
symbolics of the current discourse about terrorism and national security in the
United States, demonstrating the gendered nature of the panic about terrorism
and the construction of safety and patriotism. JASBIR K. PUAR, TERRORIST
ASSEMBLAGES: HOMONATIONALISM IN QUEER TIMES (2007).
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political demands. It also resists deepening the divide between
those trans people who might benefit from a tinkering with the
identity surveillance rules and those whose immigration status,
criminal record, psychiatric detention or other factors would
make the identity surveillance or gendered detention systems no
less dangerous even with certain "trans fixes."'5' At the same
time, this analysis does not suggest that there is no role for
seeking certain reforms of gender classification policies, but
rather that when such reform is engaged it be with a tactical
understanding of law rather than a belief that changing what the
law says about us is the end goal. For example, we might seek to
reduce medical evidentiary requirements in policies governing
changing sex designation on ID or placement in certain sexsegregated facilities not to make these policies "fair" or
"accurate" but to increase the life chances of trans people as part
of a larger strategy of mobilization around demands that exceed
legal reform such as prison abolition and an end to immigration
enforcement. In such a context, law reform is a tactic rather than

51 The ways that equality claims can rcify divides within constituencies
where some stand to benefit from the falsely universal right to which they aspire
to be included while others have little to gain is captured in the following
passage where Butler reflects on legal inclusion campaigns that have become
central to gay and lesbian politics in recent years:
One might say that the advances that are sought by
mainstream liberal activists (inclusion in the military and
in marriage) are an extension of democracy and a
hegemonic advance to the extent that lesbian and gay
people arc making the claim to be treated as equal to other
citizens with respect to these obligationsand entitlements,
and that the prospect of their inclusion in these institutions
is a sign that they are at present carrying the universalizing
promise of hegemony itself. But this would not be a
salutary conclusion, for the instatement of these
questionable rights and obligations for some lesbians and
gays establishes norms of legitimation that work to
remarginalize others and foreclose possibilities for sexual
freedom which have also been long-standing goals of the
movement. The naturalization of the military-marriage
goal for gay politics also marginalizes those for whom one
or the other of these institutions is anathema, if not
inimical.
JUDITH BUTLER, ANTIGONE'S CLAIM 160 (2002).
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an end, 52 and resistance is theorized through mobilization
strategies that include attention to the impact of legal systems,
particularly administrative rules, on the survival and political
participation of people targeted for racialized-gendered
surveillance and imprisonment.53
Butler's work also troubles the category of the "human" in
relation to rights discourse and governmentality in ways that
may be particularly useful to trans interrogation of how
identities are mobilized for population-level distribution projects
(e.g. stateness). She writes:
There are advantages to conceiving power in
such a way that it is not centered in the nationstate, but conceived, rather, to operate as well
through non-state institutions and discourses,
since the points of intervention have
proliferated, and the aim of politics is not only
or merely the overthrow of the state. A broader
set of tactics are opened up by the field of
governmentality, including those discourses
that shape and deform what we mean by 'the
54
human.'
In her analysis of post 9/11 racial profiling and detention, Butler
talks about how those "deemed dangerous" are:
[Taken] outside the jurisdiction of the law,
depriv[ed] ... of the legal protections to which
subjects under national and international law
are entitled . . . not regarded as subjects,
52 "[G]overnmcntality makes concrete the understanding of power as
irreducible to law." PRECARIOUS LIFE, supra note 38, at 94.
53 For further discussion of this framing of legal reform as a tactic in the
service of mass mobilization strategies for change see Dean Spade Rickke
Mananzala, The Nonprofit Industrial Complex and Trans Resistance, 5
SEXUALITY, RES. SOC. POL'Y 1, 61-63 (2008); Elana Redfield, Pooja Gehi
Gabriel Arkles, Setting the Agenda of the Struggle for Trans Liberation Setting
the Agenda of the Struggle for Trans Liberation, SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.

(forthcoming 2011).
14 PRECARIOUS LIFE, supra note 38, at 99.
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humans
not conceptualized within the
frame of a political culture in which human
lives are underwritten by legal
entitlements . .55
In Undoing Gender, she suggests that gender "figures as a
precondition for the production and maintenance of legible
humanity. '56 These and other reflections on the category of the
human, along with her discussion of what constitutes grievable
life and her interrogation of how certain deaths are made hyper
visible and others never depicted, 57 establish a provocative
framework for considering the relationship between rights
claims, the category "human," and state racism as conceived by
Foucault.
Andrea Smith has argued that "the project of aspiring to
humanity is always already a racial project. '5 8 Smith
interrogates the universality of the category of the human,
arguing that the category
is always constituted in relation to
"affectable others" 59 and that this relation is always a racial one.
Claims to rights and citizenship, which in Butler's fornulation
are tied to what is considered human, similarly mobilize a
universalism that denies its own racialized and gendered
specificity. Critiques of campaigns to include "'gender identity
and expression" in hate crimes laws and anti-discrimination laws
reflect these analyses and might be read through Foucault's
formulation of state racism. Critics of hate crimes laws have
articulated several main concerns about the claim that being
included in hate crimes statutes is important in responding to the
high levels of violence faced by trans people and in establishing
55I. at 77.
56 JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER, I1 (2004). She further discusses

how category of the human works by excluding and how it is thoroughly
racialized and gendered. Id. at 13
57 PRECARIOUS LIFE, supra note 38, at 37.
58 Andrea Smith, Queer Theory and Native Studies: The Heterosexism oj.
Settler Colonialism, 16 GAY LESBIAN Q. 1, 1-2, 42.
51 Id. at 42 (citing DENISE FERREIRA DA SILVA, TOWARD A GLOBAL IDEA OF
RACE 169 (2007)).
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that we are human. 60 First, hate crimes laws have never been
proven to deter violence, so their effect is entirely punitive and
does not increase the life chances or life spans of trans people.
Second, given the rapid and massive racialized expansion of
imprisonment in the United States and the disproportionate
imprisonment and severe violence faced by trans people in
prisons due to the fact that gender and sexual violence are
foundational to imprisonment, demanding increased resources
for criminalization is likely to further rather than reduce trans
vulnerability to violence. 6 1 If the most significant perpetrator of
violence against trans people is the criminal punishment system,
what does it mean to have the murders of trans people used as
fuel to build that system? What does it mean to prove our
equality or humanity in terms of having a life that, when ended,
triggers someone's punishment in that system? Third, critics
60 A common anecdote passed around trans communities, particularly
at
Day of Remembrance events and other events marking trans vulnerability to
violence is that our murders, even when found guilty, frequently receive a lower
sentence than what would be given for killing a dog. Whether this anecdote is
reflective of one or many actual events, or none at all, it suggests this equation of
being considered fully human and having your murderer punished severely. I
have also seen that equation circulate in domestic violence advocacy in states
where advocates are pushing for higher felony penalties for domestic violence,
often aiming them to be equated with those of other "serious crimes." For useful
critiques of criminalization as a response to domestic violence and the racial
significance of prosecution becoming a primary strategy for addressing domestic

violence promoted by white feminists see KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE
STATE (2008); KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE!

ANTHOLOGY (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence cd., 2006).

(,1 Press Release, Sylvia Rivera L. Project, SRLP Announces Non-Support
of the Gender Expression Non-Discrimination Act, (Apr. 6, 2009), available at
http://srlp.org/genda; Michelle Chen, Do Unto Others: The Moral Slope of Hate
Crimes Laws, COLORLINES.COM (Aug. 4, 2009, 10:07 PM), http://
colorlines.com/archivcs/2009/08/do unto others the moral slope.html;
Katherine Whitlock, In a Time of Broken Bones: A Dialogue about Hate Violence
and the Linitations of Hate Crimes Legislation (Justice Visions Working Paper,
2001), available at http://srlp.org/filcs/Brokcn%2Bones-l.pdf; Press Release,
Sylvia Rivera L. Project, SRLP Opposes Matthew Shepard James Byrd Hate

Crimes

Prevention

Act,

SYLVIA

RIVERA LAW PROJECT,

http://srlp.org/

fedhatecrimelaw (last visited June 26, 201 I); Pablo Espinoza et al., In Support of
Comunnities Responding to Violence: A Note on the Richmond Sexual Assault
Matthew Shepard Act, COMMUNITY UNITED AGAINST VIOLENCE BLOG, http://

www.cuav.org/blogpost/9; Dean Spade, Trans Law Reform Strategies, CoOptation, and the Potential for Transformative Change, 30 RUTGERS WOMEN'S
RTS L. REV. 288 (2009).
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charge that hate crimes laws participate in obscuring systemic
racialized-gendered violence and harm by scapegoating
individual perpetrators. This participates in an individualized
framing of racism and transphobia, suggesting that it is a
problem of a few people with bad ideas rather than that
racialized and gendered norms constitute national belonging and
the distribution of life chances. Finally, critics argue that the
telling of transphobic violence through the lens of "hate crime"
transforms this violence into a one-dimensional framework that
pretends that all trans people are equally vulnerable to it and
erases the race, class, ability, national origin and other vectors
that produce certain trans people as especially vulnerable to
murder. 62 Because the same populations most vulnerable to
murder are those targeted for cyclical abandonment and
imprisonment in neoliberalism, using hate crimes laws as the
approach to violence experienced by trans people means
choosing a remedy that will maximize violence to those most
vulnerable and probably be most attractive to those least
vulnerable (not coincidentally, those people with the most race,
class and educational privilege also63tend to be setting policy and
law reform agendas in non-profits).

These critical interrogations of campaigns for inclusion in
hate crimes laws have parallels in critiques of antidiscrimination laws. First, critics of anti-discrimination law
inclusion campaigns argue that the single-vector rhetoric of
these campaigns, which focus on being deprived employment or
other opportunities "just for being trans," erase the systemic
exploitation and economic marginalization that produces and
62

Sarah Lamble, Retelling Racialized Violence, Remaking White

Innocence: The Politics of Interlocking Oppressions in Transgender Day of
Remembrance, 5 SEXUALITY, RES. SOC. POL'Y 24 (2008) (noting how the
narratives about trans murder victims at Transgender Day of Remembrance
gatherings erase the race, class, ability, and national origin vectors of violence
contributing to the victim's vulnerability in order to create a narrow story about
how they were murdered for being trans).
63 For an analysis of the impact of non-profitization of social justice

formations on the demands of social movements, see THE REVOLUTION WILL
NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (INCITE!
Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2009) and for a trans-focused application
of this analysis see Spade & Mananzala, supra note 53; Redfield, Gehi & Arkles,
supra note 53.
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maintains a racialized and gendered wealth gap and suggest that
"but for" people being fired "just for being trans" equal
opportunity exists and the economy is fair. Second, these
campaigns generally center on stories of white, professional,

patriotic, 64 authorized (in terms of immigration status) workers
whose only barrier to gainful employment was their trans

64 One of the most celebrated legal victories in trans rights in recent years
was the ACLU's case on behalf of Diane Schroer. The press coverage and the
ACLU's advocacy and public education work about the case centered Schroer's
expertise in anti-terrorism. The ACLU, which litigated the Schroer case, framed
the case as follows:

Schroer was an Airborne Ranger qualified Special Forces
officer who completed over 450 parachute jumps, received
numerous decorations including the Defense Superior
Service Medal, and was hand-picked to head up a
classified national security operation. She began taking
steps to transition from male to female shortly after
retiring as a Colonel after 25 years of distinguished service
in the Army. When she interviewed for a job as a terrorism
research analyst at the Library of Congress, she thought
she'd found the perfect fit, given her background and
16,000-volume home library collection on military history,
the art of war, international relations and political
philosophy. Schroer accepted the position, but when she
told her future supervisor that she was in the process of
gender transition, they rescinded the job offer.
Schroer v. Library of Congress Case File, ACLU.ORG (Nov. 19, 2009), http://
www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights hiv-aids/schroer-v-library-congress-case-profile.
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identity. 65 Such framings again produce demands for inclusion

from which only the privileged few can actually benefit, and
deepen race, class, national origin and ability divides. Third,
critics point out that anti-discrimination laws do not seem to
have resolved wealth and income disparity, disproportionate
unemployment and homelessness, and other harms for other
groups that have been covered by these laws for decades.
Instead, these "advances" are often used to argue that because
formal discrimination is now illegal, disparities in life chances
must be the fault of the populations enduring them. Finally, like
hate crimes laws, anti-discrimination laws posit an
individualized vision of discrimination that seeks out aberrant
individuals with bad ideas and leaves broader conditions of
66
distribution unexamined.
These critiques intersect with an analysis of the category of
the human and its relationship to legal rights that interrogates
claims to universality by exposing that these purportedly
universal protections not only provide rare and limited
protection for a small group, but also primarily operate to
65
See Dan Irving, Normalized Transgressions. Legitimizing the
Transsexual Body as Productive, 100 RADICAL HIST. REV. 38 (2008). In
Imitation and Gender InsubordinationButler talks about how visibility projects,
as they aim to resist erasure of certain identities, tend to set the terms of those
identities in ways that exclude and foreclose future possibilities.

There is no question that gays and lesbians are threatened
by the violence of public erasure, but the decision to
counter that violence must be careful not to reinstall
another in its place. Which version of lesbian or gay ought
to be rendered visible, and which internal exclusions will
that rendering visible institute? ...That any consolidation
of identity requires some set of differentiations and
exclusions seems clear. But which ones ought to be
valorized?
Id. at 311. These themes are visible in the framing of cases regarding
employment discrimination and in the campaigns for employment discrimination
laws, where transgender identity is deployed in narrow frameworks of belonging
that establish the deserving subjects of legal protection.
66 See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of'Suprente CourtDoctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1978); Dean Spade, Keynote Address: Trans Law Politics
on a NeoliberalLandscape, 18 TEMP. POL. CIv.RTS. L. REV. 353 (2009).
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stabilize and uphold relations of disparity that will not be
overcome by declarations of equality within a legal system
founded on and maintained by racialized-gendered property
relations 67 and a racialized distribution of vulnerability to
premature death. 68 Critics of hate crimes laws make a move
parallel to Butler's interrogation of what constitutes grievable
life when they question how grievability is entwined with
becoming a population that produces increased punishing power
for the criminal punishment system, and when they examine
how trans murder victims' lives and deaths are mobilized as
grievable through the erasure of their actual conditions of
vulnerability (including homelessness, poverty, racialization) so
that their stories can be told through a narrow narrative that can
justify criminalization as a response.
These critiques illuminate law's tactical role in an era
where formal legal equality constitutes a window dressing for
growing material inequality and expanding state capacities for
racialized-gendered surveillance, caging, and war-making. They
show how little the most vulnerable trans people have to gain
from becoming enfolded into the "equality" and "humanity"
frameworks offered by these law reforms, and they expose how
these identities are reconstituted to become productive for
ongoing projects of nationmaking founded in heteropatriarchal
slavery and settler colonialism and continued through
criminalization, immigration enforcement, displacement and
occupation. These critiques demonstrate how theories of change
based in the idea that if we change what the law says about a
group ("make it say we are good and not bad!") changes in life
chances will result misunderstand power. These law reformcentered theories of change rely on a kind of centralized power
that assumes obedience to the law that has not been evidenced,
as anti-discrimination laws have failed to reduce health, income,
housing and criminalization disparities corresponding to race,
gender, indigeneity, disability or national origin. Instead, we
67See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 276-91 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw

et al. cds., 1995).
68 See RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS,
CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 28 (Earl Lewis et al. eds.,

2007).
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come to understand the decentralized nature of governance and
the superficial role of legal declarations of formal equality. It
turns out that even if we pass anti-discrimination laws that
purport to protect trans people from discrimination, not only do
they not work where they are supposed to work (employment,
sometimes public accommodations, housing, social services),
but they also do not even touch the key issues that may
determine trans people's life chances. Even where gender
identity and expression discrimination is barred by law, trans
women are still placed in men's prisons, arrested for doing sex
work, denied access to domestic violence shelters, denied gender
confirming healthcare by Medicaid, deported, and subjected to
all manner of other conditions that attend the racializedgendered distribution of life chances.
To analyze the impacts of and potential resistance to the
existing distribution of life chances, a different theorization of
power from what is offered by most law reform projects is
required. Foucault's formulation of state racism and biopolitics
helps us to grasp how the production of populations deemed
dangerous and lives that are ungrievable is a necessary element
of the project of producing a population made to live. Legal
equality projects often mobilize disciplinary norms to frame
deserving and undeserving populations with the aim of obtaining
inclusion. Penney describes Butler's articulation of this
phenomenon:
Butler admirably underscores how official
forms of social legitimization-like marriage
-associated
with regimes of state power
create a kind of shadowy "parallel universe" of
invisible and voiceless subjects who are not
only concretely oppressed by such instances of
normative control, but who also, more
radically, remain fundamentally culturally
unintelligible; underneath the threshold of
representation, in other words, defining the
acceptable forms of life. 69
A critique of trans legal equality inclusion projects calls for a

69 Penncy,

supra note 69, at 1I.
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different politics, one that centers the experiences of people
facing multiple vectors of vulnerability to violence and reduced
life chances, so that an analysis of the forces producing those
conditions will avoid misunderstandings of power and
subjection that attend legal equality demands.
Butler's discussion of the limitations of the military
tribunals that are demanded for Guantanamo prisoners who are
not understood to have a right to a trial suggests an analytical
method that may be useful. She interrogates the demand for
trials by questioning the quality of the proceedings, pointing out
the severe flaws in the process that produce a "mockery" rather
than any process that could be said to allow a meaningful right
to defense.70 Butler's refusal to believe what the law says about
itself (that these military tribunals constitute trials, that these
prisoners are not prisoners 7' and therefore do not deserve trials)
is a move that a critical trans legal scholarship must adopt.
Rather than uncritically demanding rights, our work must be to
examine what the content of those guarantees is, and whether
they constitute window dressing, papering over actual operations
of population management that produce and distribute
vulnerability through vectors of race, national origin, religion,
ability, and gender under a pretense of universal individual
rights.
Andrea Smith's critique of Butler's analysis of
Guantanamo is also useful here. Smith critiques Butler and other
scholars who frame certain "War on Terror" developments as
exceptional and decried Bush's "lawlessness." Smith suggests
that these framings rely on the U.S. Constitution as their origin,
"presuming the US nation-state even as they critique it."'72
Smith's analysis suggests that there is nothing exceptional about
the detention at Guantanamo both because the U.S. Constitution

70See PRECARIOUS LIFE, supra note 38, at 69.
71Id. at 85.
72Andrea Smith, American Studies without America: Native Feminisins
and the Nation State, 60 AM. Q. 309, 311(2008).
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permits it7 3 and because we would be naive to think that
obedience to Constitutional mandates would deliver fairer or less
violent results given that the U.S. legal system is rooted in
genocide. She cites Luana Ross' observation that "genocide has
never been against the law in the United States."74
Smith's intervention invites us to take Butler's invitation to
question what the law says about itself even further, and we
might raise questions like those Butler raises about military
tribunals about criminal trials, welfare hearings, public
transportation fare hikes, administrative rulemaking processes,
immigration raids, state budgetary processes, "private"
philanthropic grantmaking decisions, taxation schemes,
foundings of charter schools and any other site of governance.
When we release the fantasy of formal legal equality in the face
of an understanding of the United States as a racial project,75 and
legal rights as often no more than window dressing or theater,
how do we begin to develop a tactical engagement with law? If
we follow Foucault's assertion that "politics is war by other
means "76 and understand that theories of social contract only
"erase the conquest, ' 77 inclusion claims in legal equality
frameworks can be seen to both misunderstand how law is
deployed as a tactic in the context of governnentality and how
the production of killable populations to sustain the nation
requires analysis that moves beyond the level of the individual.
When our analysis turns to governmentality, administrative
functions in law take on a much more significant role, and the
regularization of the population through gathering of
standardized data and other mechanisms of sorting become
central questions. Thus far, trans legal scholarship and activism
73Id. (citing Sora Han, Bonds of Representation: Vision, Race, and Law in
Post-Civil Rights America (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California Santa Cruz)).

74Id. at 310.
75 HOWARD WINANT & MICHAEL OMI, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED

STATES (2d ed. 1994).
76

HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, sulpra note 14, at 93.

77 Mariana Valverde, Genealogies of European States: Foucauldiai
Reflections, 36 ECON. SOC'Y 1,166 (2007).
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has focused far more attention on disciplinary norms than the
deployment of regulatory norms at the level of population, and
an analysis of both operations and their interrelation is necessary
to properly theorize and strategize resistance.
I am hopeful that such analysis may also open up critical
interrogation of various data gathering practices taken up within
trans resistance frameworks, not limited to client databases at
social service agencies, needs assessments of communities,
demands for inclusion in government data collecting tools like
the Census, and assertion of statistics about trans experiences of
violence and discrimination. How do these strategies mobilize
static categories of identity that produce regulatory norms that
might require critique? More broadly, taking up a governmental
analysis may bring trans politics to the questions that Foucault
raises at the end of "Society Must Be Defended" when he argues
that state racism inherent in biopolitics is present in the various
alternatives to capitalism that are proposed by people seeking to
transform economic and political systems. 78 If we understand all
projects of redistribution to produce forms of stateness, and state
racism to be inherent to those projects, what might a trans
politics formed in an Foucauldian analysis of power and
applying Butler's theorization of gender envision when we
dream of alternatives to neoliberalism? Smith suggests a need to
think about more just forms of governance, and to imagine
"visions of nation and sovereignty that are separate from nationstates. ' 79 What will those visions look like from the vantage
point of a trans politics centered in an understanding of
racialized-gendered subjection and a critique of liberation
projects that embraces failure and excess while demanding
attention to the material conditions of existence and the
distribution of life chances?

78"SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED", supra note 15, at 262-63.
79Smith, supra note 72, at 312.
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